The proof of the No-Go Theorem of unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment depends on the assumption that Alice knows every detail of the protocol, including the probability distributions associated with all the random variables generated by Bob. We argue that this condition may not be universally satisfied. In fact it can be shown that when Bob is allowed to use a secret probability distribution, the joint quantum state is inevitably mixed. It is then natural to ask if Alice can still cheat. A positive answer has been given by us [13] for the perfect concealing case. In this paper, we present a simplified proof of our previous result, and extend it to cover the imperfect concealing case as well.
Quantum bit commitment is an important two-party primitive in quantum cryptography, because a secure quantum bit commitment protocol can be used to guarantee the security of a number of other cryptographic protocols. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] Bit commitment involves a sender (Alice) and a receiver (Bob). Alice commits to Bob a secret bit b ∈ {0, 1} and at the same time provides him with a piece of evidence. When Alice unveils the secret bit sometime in the future, Bob can check the evidence and verify that the unveiled bit is the same as what was committed by Alice in the beginning. Now Alice and Bob do not trust each other, in the sense that Bob would try to gain information about the committed bit (from the provided evidence) before Alice unveils it, and Alice would try to change her commitment if it is to her advantage to do so. A bit commitment protocol is said to be secure if, (1) Bob cannot know the value of b before Alice reveals it (concealing), and (2) Alice cannot change b without Bob's knowledge (binding). 
the protocol is said to be perfect concealing, and obviously Bob is not able to extract any information about the value of b from the ρ b B in his possession. For imperfect protocols, the two density matrices are equal only asymptotically as the security parameter N → ∞. For large but finite N, one has
so that Bob's knowledge of b (before Alice unveils it) vanishes in the limit N → ∞.
If a QBC protocol is secure even if both Alice and Bob had unlimited computing power, then it is said to be unconditionally secure. Unfortunately unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is ruled out by a no-go theorem [10, 11] . In essence the theorem says that, if a protocol is concealing to Bob, then it is cannot be binding to Alice. That means, if or vice versa by operating on her own quantum particles only. As a result she can commit to one bit value and safely unveils another without Bob's knowledge. It is not hard to see that this no-go conclusion depends on the assumption that Alice can always calculate U A without the help of Bob, which is equivalent to saying that she knows "every detail of the protocol, including the distribution of probability of a random variable generated by another participant" [12] . However it is not obvious that this condition is universally valid in all possible QBC protocols. And when it is not, the validity of the no-go proof needs to be reexamined.
In the picture where all random variables are purified (that is, where all unrevealed classical choices are left undetermined by quantum entanglement), the only parameters that can remain secret are probability distributions. The problem of secret probability distributions in QBC has been addressed partially in [13] , where we showed that for perfect concealing protocols Alice can still safely cheat even if she does not know the probability distribution Bob used to entangle a random variable. The purpose of this paper is to provide a simplified proof of our earlier result, furthermore we show that the same conclusion applies to imperfect concealing protocols as well.
To facilitate our discussion, we shall first outline the proof of the no-go theorem below.
The crucial observation is that, using quantum entanglement, Alice and Bob can keep all undisclosed classical information undetermined and stored at the quantum level. In other words, they can always choose to delay any prescribed classical actions without consequences until it is required to disclose the outcomes. Then one can assume that, at the end of the commitment procedure, there exists a pure state |ψ 
Note that, because H A and H B are disjoint, whether Bob actually purifies or not is irrelevant to Alice, without loss of generality she can assume he always does. In general, purification requires access to fully functioning quantum computers, which is nevertheless not a problem since both participants are assumed to have unlimited computational power. B are close but unequal. Quantitatively that means the fidelity F of the two density matrices is close to one. Using Uhlmann's theorem [15] , we can write
where ǫ → 0 as the security parameter N → ∞, |φ
Since |ψ 
So Alice can also cheat when ρ One may doubt if this is a valid question, for what we are saying is that |ψ b AB may be unknown to Alice and she is actually dealing with a mixed state, while as we saw the proof of the no-go theorem depends critically on the assumption that |ψ b AB is pure. The original idea of the no-go proof is that whenever there is a random variable which renders the quantum state a mixed one, Alice can always work with the corresponding purified state.
But that is possible only if she knew the probability distribution associated with the random variable in question. However if the probability distribution (ω) is unknown, then the state is inevitably a mixed one, and any further purification attempt using another unknown probability distribution will not change that.
So the question being raised here is this: If a protocol allows Bob to choose a probability distribution ω which is not disclosed to Alice, could she still cheat by entanglement attack?
Unfortunately the answer is positive for both perfect and imperfect concealing protocols, as we shall show in the following.
Consider first the perfect concealing case. It has been discussed in [13] , and we are presenting here a simplified and improved proof. Suppose ω 1 and ω 2 are any two possible probability distributions that Bob can use, the concealing condition implies that
where U A (ω 1 ) and U A (ω 2 ) are unitary operators acting on Alice's particles. Obviously Bob has the freedom to entangle his choices, in which case the overall state is given by
where p is a real number, 0 < p < 1, |λ 1,2 are ancilla states controlled by Bob, and 
whereŨ A may or may not depend on p, ω 1 , and ω 2 . Since the ancilla states |λ 1 and |λ 2 are not affected by U A , and they are orthogonal, it is easy to see that
Comparing these relations with with Eqs. (8,9), we get
for arbitrary ω 1 and ω 2 . HenceŨ A depends neither on p nor ω. Therefore, as long as ρ 
where 0 < ǫ 1,2 < 1, and ǫ 1,2 → 0 as the security parameter N approaches infinity. As before when Bob entangles his choices as in Eq. (10), there exists aŨ A such that
whereǫ → 0 as N → ∞. Substituting Eq. (10) into this equation gives
where 0 ≤ δ 1,2 ≤ 1. Then Eq. (18) gives
for arbitrary p, which implies that as the security parameter N → ∞, 
for arbitrary ω 1 and ω 2 , such that in the limit of N → ∞,
Consequently Alice only needs to calculate U A (ω) for any value of ω, and she can use it to change her committed bit if she prefers -her chance of being discovered approaches zero when the security parameter N approaches infinity. In summary we have argued in this paper that Alice cannot possibly know all the probability distributions used by Bob, because they do not trust each other. Then for a complete proof of the no-go result, one must also address the following question: In protocols where Bob is allowed to use probability distributions unknown to Alice during the commitment phase, can Alice still apply the entanglement attack? The answer we have arrived at is positive for both perfect and imperfect concealing cases, so unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment remains impossible.
